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NOTES
DISCLOSURE OF FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN UNITED STATES
AGRICULTURAL PROPERTY
I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 14, 1978, Congress passed the Agricultural Foreign
Investment Disclosure Act,' to require reports by foreign persons
of their holdings in agricultural property. The Act directs the Secretary of Agriculture to compile data from these reports, and to
analyze the effect of foreign investment upon the agricultural economy. 2 In its 1976 survey of foreign direct investment in the United

States, 3 the Department of Commerce found that, although sufficient data existed in most areas of the economy to support an
assessment of the effect of foreign direct investment, data on foreign ownership of real estate was insufficient.4 This was attributed
primarily to the anonymity of most real estate transactions, and
to the limitations of existing recordation and land data systems.'
Based on limited data, the survey estimated that foreign persons
owned 4.9 million acres of real estate in the United States, of which
22 percent, or approximately one million acres, was agricultural
1. Act of Oct. 14, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-460, 92 Stat. 1263 (to be codified at 7
U.S.C. §§ 3501-3508); see H.R. REP. No. 1570, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1978).
2. Act of Oct. 14, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-460, § 5, 92 Stat. 1263 (to be codified
at 7 U.S.C. § 3504).
3. The Foreign Investment Study Act authorized the first benchmark survey
of foreign investment in the United States since 1959. Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78b note (1976)); see H.R.
REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974). The Department of Commerce
conducted the study of direct investment, which was defined as foreign participation in an enterprise of ten percent or more, to permit comparison with United
States direct investment abroad. U.S. DEP'T OF COMERCE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT To THE CONGRESS 4-6 (1976) (9 volumes)
[hereinafter cited as BENCHMARK SURVEY]. The Department of the Treasury conducted the study of portfolio investment, and reported its findings in a twovolume set. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON FOREIGN
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT IN THE UNrrE STATES (1976). See generallyForeignInvestment Study Act of 1974: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce
and Tourism of the Senate Commerce Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
4. 1 BENCHMARK SURVEY, supra note 3, at 193.
5. Id. at 182, 183-84, 193; see Cook, Land Information Systems, in 8
BENCHMARK SURVEY, supra note 3, at L-113.
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property.' These foreign holdings amounted to 0.1 percent of the
7
1.1 billion acres of United States farmland.
The Act is one of several responses by Congress to economic
conditions in the agricultural sector which are said to threaten the
existence of the "family farm," usually defined to include small,
owner-operated farms.8 Congress saw foreign investment in agricultural property as contributing to these problems primarily
through rising land prices and absentee ownership of farms.' Although the Act may help fill a significant gap in information on
foreign investment in agricultural property, it is not clear that it
will contribute substantially to solving the current economic problems of small farmers. The information available to Congress suggests that these problems are caused largely by increases in operating costs relative to production prices, the superior economic position of larger farm units,"0 and governmental policies which favor
the development of larger farms." The Act also raises the potential
for conflict with other countries. Even though it does not impose
restrictions upon the right of foreign persons to own real estate,
foreign nations may see the Act as a signal that the United States
is critically examining its longstanding "open door" policy toward
foreign investment," or even as the beginnings of a reversal of that
policy. Finally, the Act raises problems of United States jurisdiction to require disclosure by foreign corporations operating in the
United States through subsidiaries, as well as potential conflict
with foreign secrecy laws. This note will examine the background
and operation of the Act in light of these issues, and will address
potential conflicts of the Act with state disclosure laws and United
States treaty obligations.
6. 1 BENCHMARK SURVEY, supra note 3, at 184. Some private estimates of
foreign ownership were higher. See Inouye, PoliticalImplications of ForeignInvestment in the United States, 27 MERCER L. REv. 597 (1976).
7.

1 BENCHhARuc SURVEY, supra note 3, at 184.

8. See CONGHESSIoNAL BUDGEr OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, PUBuC POLICY AND

THE
CHANGING STRUCTURE OF AMERcAN AGRICULTURE, at xiii, 4 (1978) [hereinafter

cited as CHANGING STRUCTURE].
9. See H.R. REP. No. 1570, supra note 1, at 7-8.
10. See part II.A. infra.
11.

See CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 8.
See S. REP. No. 910, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974); cf. Press Release 600,
35 DEP'T ST. BULL. 935-36 (1956) (announcing FCN treaty with the Republic of

12.

Korea).
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I.

BACKGROUND OF THE

ACT

A. Economic Pressures on the Family Farm
Numerous statistics were cited during consideration of the Act
which were said to indicate that the existence of the family farm
might be threatened. For example, the number of family farms
declined 42 percent between 1910 and 1964, and the family farm's
share of total acreage fell from more than half to less than 30
percent. 3 Similarly, the total number of farms declined from 6.8
to 2.7 million between the late 1930's and 1977.11 Notwithstanding
this decline in actual numbers, however, in recent years more than
90 percent of all farms have been family farms. 15 These figures
reflect the fact that farm size has increased over the years, partly
as a result of increased mechanization, which enables an individual farmer to cultivate more land. Some commentators have
argued that governmental policies have favored the development
of large farms since the late nineteenth century, 7 and that this has
contributed to the rise of large agribusiness concerns, which presently own farms averaging seven times larger than those owned by
family farms." These commentators argue that the equal application of commodity price support and subsidy policies to large and
small farms resulted in disproportionate benefits to the large
farms. 9 Other commentators have noted that increased mechanization encouraged larger farms, where machines can be used more
efficiently.2" A study by the Congressional Budget Office reached
similar conclusions, noting that price supports, tax policies, and
13. 124 CONG. REC. E3504 (daily ed. June 28, 1978) (remarks of George
Rucker). For statistical purposes, a family farm is defined as "any farm that
annually uses less than 1.5 man-years of hired labor and is not operated by a hired
manager." CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 8, at xiii.
14. CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 8, at 1-3.
15. See id. at 21-22.
16. See id. at 29-31.
17. See Heady, Externalities of American Agricultural Policy, 7 U. TOL. L.
Rav. 795 (1976); Scher, Catz & Mathews, USDA: Agriculture at the Expense of
Small Farmers and Farmworkers, id. at 837.
18. 124 CONG. REC. E3504 (daily ed. June 28, 1978) (remarks of George
Rucker).
19. Heady, supra note 17, at 811-12.
20.

U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FARM REAL ESTATE MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 5

(1978) [hereinafter cited as MARKET DEVELOPMENTS]; MacDonald, The Family:
How Are You Going to Keep Them Down on the Farm?, 35 MONT. L. REv. 88
(1974).
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extension services all benefitted farms in proportion to their size,
2
with the result that large farms were favored. 1
As a result of the increase in farm size and absentee ownership
of farms, demand for local goods and services declined as more
agricultural inputs were purchased from wholesalers in larger communities. 22 To reverse the decline of rural communities which followed, in 1972 Congress enacted the Rural Development Act, 23
which provided funding for projects and business loans for rural
areas.Y Both insufficient funding 25 and contrary policies within the
Department of Agriculture2 hampered this program. The effect of
large farms upon rural communities is being addressed by a bill
introduced in the 96th Congress, the Family Farm Antitrust Act. 27
The bill would prevent ownership or longterm leasing of agricultural property by persons whose non-farming business assets ex2
ceed fifteen million dollars. 1
Numerous relatively short-term economic conditions have been
found to have a detrimental effect on the family farm. Among
them are high land prices, high taxes, rising costs of agricultural
inputs, and low farm product prices. 9 Congress has addressed
these problems with several statutes and proposed bills. Estate
taxation often makes passing a family farm to the next generation
21. CHANGING STRucruE, supra note 8, at 45-55.
22. See Heady, supra note 17, at 812-13.
23. Act of Aug. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-419, 86 Stat. 657 (codified in scattered
sections of 7 U.S.C.).
24. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1926(a)(2), 1933 (1976).
25. See Heady, supra note 17, at 814-15, 815 n.104.
26. See Scher, Catz & Mathews, supra note 17.
27. H.R. 1045, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 334, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); see 125 CONG. REc. H187, E109-10 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979) (remarks and
statement of Rep. Kastenmeier); id. at S1053 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1979) (remarks
of Sen. Bayh and text of S. 334). The bill was first introduced by Senators
Abourezk and Nelson, as the Family Farm Antitrust Act of 1973, S. 950, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See Abourezk, Agriculture, Antitrust and Agribusiness:
A Proposalfor Federal Action, 20 S.D. L. Rv. 499 (1975).
28. S. 334, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1979). The House version restricts
persons with three million dollars in non-farm assets. See 125 CONG. REC. E109
(daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). See generally MacDonald, supra note 20, at 89-90; Rosenberg, Vertical Integrationin the CattleFeeding
Industry and the Packers and Stockyards Administration,7 U. TOL. L. REv. 935
(1976); see also Warlich & Brill, Cooperatives vis-a-vis Corporations:Size, Antitrust and Immunity, 23 S.D. L. REv. 561 (1978).
29. H.R. REP. No. 1570, supra note 1, at 6.
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difficult. 0 This was alleviated to a degree by the Tax Reform Act
of 1976,1' which added sections 2032A, 6166 and 6166A to the Internal Revenue Code. Section 2032A permits a special valuation
method for a family farm under certain circumstances;"2 sections
6166 and 6166A provide for deferral of estate tax for fifteen and ten
years, respectively. Low farm product prices, alleviated for many
years by price supports,3 have produced several bills in the 96th
Congress to raise price supports.u Several bills establish cost of
production boards, to monitor and study costs of agricultural inputs. Both prices and costs were addressed by enactments in 1977
and 1978.31

Land prices doubled in some areas and tripled in others between
1970 and 1977.38 Average prices nationwide doubled between 1970
and 1977 and tripled between 1965 and 1977; by comparison, the
Fortune 500 stock average remained unchanged. 9 Department of
Agriculture statistics showed that while the land value of all farmland increased by 339 billion dollars between 1972 and 1976, net
30. See Kelley, Estate Tax Reform and Agriculture, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 897,
897 (1976).
31. Act of Oct. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
32. See I.R.C. § 2032A. See generally Bock & McCord, Estate Tax Valuation
of Farmland Under Section 2032A of the Internal Revenue Code, 1978 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 145.
33. I.R.C. §§ 6166(a), 6166A(a). See generally Campbell & Carroll, Section
6166: Preserving the Family Business or Family Farm Through Estate Tax
Deferral, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 521 (1976).
34. See Heady, supra note 17, at 808; Comment, FederalRegulation of Agriculture: The Conflict Between Economic Realities and Social Goals, 5 J. PuB. L.
248, 254 n.38 (1956).

35. See, e.g., H.R. 2416, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 418, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) (providing for "flexible parity"); 125 CONG. REc. H897 (daily ed. Feb.
26, 1979); id. S1450-51 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1979).
36. See, e.g., H.R. 2130, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 1, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) (also providing for price supports); 125 CONG. REc. H628 (daily ed.
Feb. 13, 1979); id. at S59 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1979).
37. Emergency Agricultural Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-279, 92 Stat. 240 (to
be codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); Food and Agriculture Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-113, 91 Stat. 913 (to be codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
38. See H.R. REP. No. 1570, supra note 1, at 6; MAWM DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 20, at 18; 124 CONG. REc. H8574 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
Grassley); id. at H5925 (daily ed. June 22, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Whitten).
39. See H.R. REP. No. 1570, supra note 1, at 7, 27; S. REP. No. 1072, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978).
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farm income during the same period was 144 billion dollars. 0
These developments raised concern that farmland might have
more value as a capital asset than as a means of production.' Such
economic conditions would mean that investment would be channelled into the agricultural land market; the presence of too much
money in land markets has been noted as a possible cause of increased prices. On this premise the Family Farm Antitrust Act,
introduced in the 96th Congress, seeks to forbid purchases of agri42
cultural property by large agribusiness concerns.
Inflation has been noted as another possible cause of increased
prices due to a view of land as a strong hedge against the declining
value of the dollar. 3 Several bills providing for loan programs have
been introduced in the 96th Congress' to make purchase of land
easier for persons entering farming.4
B.

Effect of Foreign Purchasers

Congress saw foreign purchasers as contributing to the problems
of the family farm in primarily two ways: as a source of upward
pressure on land prices, and as absentee landlords uninterested in
local communities. The House report also noted undesirble effects which might result from foreign control of the production and
marketing of specialized crops.' Conditions affecting foreign investment in agricultural property support the conclusion that land
purchases may be attractive to certain investors. In the Federal
Republic of Germany, for example, land is very expensive to acquire and to maintain, and land rents are one percent or less of
land value per year. United States farmland, relatively inexpensive and appreciating rapidly, rents for approximately five percent

40. See S. REP. No. 1072, supra note 39, at 4.
41. See H.R. REP. No. 1570, supra note 1, at 6; S. REP. No. 1072, supra note
39, at 4.
42. See 125 CONG. REC. E109 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier); notes 27-28 & accompanying text supra.
43. 124 CONG. REC. H10,758 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Hagedorn).
44. See, e.g., H.R. 1910, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); 125 CONG. REc. H470,
H554 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979).
45. See H.R. REP. No. 1570, supra note 1, at 7-8; S. REP. No. 1072, supra note
39, at 5-6. The findings of the Senate committee are contained in STAFF OF SENATE
COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY, 95TH CONG., 2D SEss., FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL LAND (Comm. Print 1979)

[hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE PRINT].
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of value.48 For the West German investor, political stability and
certainty of land title in the United States-make its farmland
preferable to that in other countries.4 7
Because of insufficient data, it has been impossible to ascertain
the number or effect of foreign purchases in the real estate market.4 8 While purchases at prices above market value were reported,4 9 no such purchases were documented."0 The Department
of Agriculture stated, on the other hand, that rising land prices
may be related more directly to other factors in the land market.
Farm enlargement accounted for 63 percent of land sales in 1976
and 1977, while purchases by absentee owners were only fifteen
percent in 1977.51 The Department concluded:
We do not believe that the amount of farmland owned by foreign
investors has had a significant impact on farmers or the agricultural
economy at this time. Of greater concern are overall trends in land
ownership in the United States, the impact of these trends on the
structure of agriculture and the future viability of a family farm
system, and the use and distribution of our land. 52
With regard to the effect of foreign persons as absentee owners the
Department concluded that "this problem of absentee ownership
is no less severe if the absentee owner is located in Chicago, New
York, or Tokyo or Milan."53
After the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, Congress' first
response to the lack of informatin on foreign investment was the
International Investment Survey Act of 1976.14 The 1976 Act provided for benchmark surveys at five-year intervals of United States
46. See Paulsen, Goals and Characteristicsof ForeignPurchasersof Farmland
in the United States, in 8 BENCHMARK SURVEY, supra note 3, at L-19, L-20 to L21.

47. See H.R. REP. No. 1570, supra note 1, at 7; Paulsen, supra note 46, at L21, L-27.
48. S. REP. No. 1072, supra note 39, at 6-7 (citing GAO study of June 1978).
49. See 124 CONG. REc. S16,869-70 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1978) (remarks of Sen.
Talmadge); WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1978, at 18, col. 2.
50. See S. REP. No. 1072, supra note 39, at 7; 1 BENCHARK SURVEY, supranote
3, at 193; COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 45, at 15.
51. See S. REP. No. 1072, supra note 39, at 14 (statement of H. Hjort, Director
of Economics, Dep't of Agriculture); id. at 22 (issue brief by Library of Congress).
52. Id. at 13 (statement of H. Hjort, Director of Economics, Dep't of Agriculture).
53. Id. at 16.
54. Act of Oct. 11, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-472, 90 Stat. 2059 (codified at 22
U.S.C. §§ 31-1-3108 (1976)).
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investment abroad, and of foreign investment in the United
States." It also provided for a feasibility study of a multipurpose
land data system "to monitor foreign direct investment in agricultural, rural, and urban real property." 6 This study57is presently
being conducted by the Department of Agriculture.
Concerned that monitoring efforts under the 1976 Act might not
produce sufficient information from exisiting sources on foreign
investment in real estate," Congress in 1978 passed the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act. While the Act is intended
to be "neutral" with regard to foreign investment," two other bills
introduced in the 96th Congress are much more restrictive of foreign agricultural investment. The Family Farm Antitrust Act provides that:
[N]o foreign person may acquire, after the date of enactment of
this section, any agricultural land unless such land (A) is acquired
by such person for an immediate or future nonfarming use, (B) is
used for such nonfarming use within five years after the date of the
acquisition of such land by such foreign person, and (C) is leased,
within one year after acquisition by such foreign person, to a family
farm for use by such family farm until such land is no longer used
for farming purposes."
Another bill, the Agricultural Foreign Investment Control Act of
1979, limits ownership of agricultural property by foreign persons
to a minority interest in one "family farm unit."'"
55. Id. § 4(b), (c) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 3103(b), (c) (1976)); see H.R. REP.
No. 1490, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4663, 4664-65.
56. Act of Oct. 11, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-472, § 4(d), 90 Stat. 2060 (codified at
22 U.S.C. § 3103(d) (1976)). See generally InternationalInvestment Survey Act
of 1975: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976).
57. See 43 Fed. Reg. 53,783 (1978) (Economics, Statistics, and Cooperatives
Service). The Department has recently completed a study entitled the Resource
Economic Survey of Land Ownership, which has compiled data from which the
effect of owner characteristics may be determined. The study does not segregate
data on foreign ownership. See S. REP. No. 1072, supra note 39, at 17.
58. S. REP. No. 1072, supra note 39, at 3, 4.
59. H.R. REP. No. 1570, supra note 1, at 11-12.
60. S. 334, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)(8A)(c)(1) (1976); see 125 CONG. REc.
S1053-55 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). For a discussion of this
bill, see text accompanying notes 27-28, 42 supra.
61. S. 194, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b) (1979); see 125 CONG. REc. S434-36
(daily ed. Jan. 23, 1979) (remarks of Sen. McGovern).
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m.

OPERATION OF THE AcT

A. Generally
The Act requires a report by any "foreign person" who acquires
or transfers an interest in agricultural property, within 90 days of
the transaction." The report must contain the name and citizenship of the foreign person, or the name, country of organization,
and principal place of business in the case of a corporation or
partnership. 3 The type of interest, the legal description ind
acreage, and the purchase price must be disclosed." If a foreign
person transfers agricultural property, the identity of the transferee must be disclosed. 5 The Act requires disclosure of interests
in agricultural property currently held by foreign persons; nonforeign persons who subsequently become foreign persons must
report their interests. Finally, interests held by a foreign person
which are converted to an agricultural use must be reported." An
"interest" in agricultural property as defined in the Regulations
includes fee interests, leaseholds of ten years or more, and certain
noncontingent interests.'
62. Act of Oct. 14, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-460, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 1263 (to be
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 3101(a)).
The first set of regulations under the Act is contained at 44 Fed. Reg. 7115
(1979). The second set, referred to herein as the Regulations, is found at 44 Fed.
Reg. 29029 (1979) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. §§ 781.1-781.4). Corrections and
interpretations appear at 44 Fed. Reg. 47526 (1979) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. §§
781.2-781.3).
63. Act of Oct. 14, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-460, § 2(a)(1)-(3), 92 Stat. 1263 (to
be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 3501(a)(1)-(3)).
64. Id. § 2(a)(4)-(6) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 3501(a)(4)-(6)).
65. Id. § 2(a)(7) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 3501(a)(7)).
66. Id. § 2(b)-(d), 90 Stat. 1264 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 3501(b)-(d)).
67. 44 Fed. Reg. 29031 (1979) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 781.2(c)). The term
"interests" includes beneficial as well as legal interests. See 124 CONG. REc.
H10,763 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Glickmen). See generally
Morrison, Legal Regulation of Alien Land Ownership in the United States, in 8
BENCHMARK SuRVEY, supra note 3, at M-40 to M-41. Security interests are not
required to be reported. Act of Oct. 14, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-460, § 2(a), 92 Stat.
1263 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 3501(a)).
The inclusion of a reporting requirement of leasehold interests in the Regulations is not clearly supported by the legislative history and background of the Act.
Language in the Senate version specifically required reporting of leaseholds, but
this language was deleted in the statute. Compare Act of Oct. 14, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 94-460, § 2, 90 Stat. 1263 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 3501) with S. 3384, §
3, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The Department of Agriculture itself had requested
that reports of leaseholds not be required under the Act because of the difficulty

674

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 12:665

To prevent concealment of ultimate ownership through a corporate structure, the Act requires disclosure of the second and third
tier of ownership. The entity owning the land is required to disclose
the identity of its shareholders. Entities in the second tier, in turn,
may be required to disclose the identites of shareholders in the

third tier. 8
The Act gives a broad definition to the term "foreign person,''"'
including non-resident aliens, foreign governments, any entity organized under the laws of a foreign country, and any United States
entity in which a non-resident alien owns directly or indirectly, "a
significant interest or substantial control." 0 This is defined in the

of administration. See Letter of Sept. 7, 1978 from Bob Bergland, Secretary of
Agriculture, to Hon. Thomas Foley, House Committee on Agriculture, reprinted
in H.R. REP. No. 1570, supra note 1, at 24 [hereinafter cited as Agriculture
Letter]. Congress, apparently, therefore, considered and rejected requiring such
disclosure. The background of the Act likewise suggests that there should be no
requirement to report leasehold interests. Foreign investors are seeking to take
advantage of capital appreciation on farmland, which requires a purchase rather
than a lease. See H.R. REP. No. 1570, supra note 1, at 11. Leasing by foreign
investors has been described as of "relatively small importance." Agriculture
Letter, supra, at 24.
The Department's position on leaseholds, on the other hand, is not totally
unjustified. First, the language deleted from the Senate bill was "leaseholds of
five or more years." See S. 3354, § 3, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The deletion
could be construed as merely giving the Department more discretion to determine
which leases should be reported. Second, to the extent that foreign investors
compete with local farmers in leasing farmland, the cost of leasing should tend
to increase; the effect on the farmer's cost of doing business would be similar to
the effect of sales of farmland.
68. Act of Oct. 14, 1978, Pub. L. No. 94-460 § 2(e), (f), 90 Stat. 1264-65 (to
be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 3501(e)(f)). Under the Regulations, disclosure by the
second tier is not automatic, but is to be made "upon request." 44 Fed. Reg. 29033
(1979) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 781.3(g)).
The definition of "foreign person" as applied to United States entities ensures
that the reporting obligation may not be evaded by setting up a string of subsidiaries. Although a report is required of only three tiers of ownership, see Act of Oct.
14, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-460, § 2(e), (f), 90 Stat. 1264-65 (to be codified at 7
U.S.C. § 3501(e), (f)), a third tier subsidiary would be defined as a "foreign
person" if a five percent interest is held by another foreign person, see 44 Fed.
Reg. 29032 (1979) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 781.2(1)). Assuming that each
subsidiary owns at least five percent of the next lower tier, each entity, including
finally the landownier, would be required to report. See id. at 47526 (to be codified
at 7 C.F.R. § 781.2 (Interpretation)).
69. Act of Oct. 14, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-460, § 9(3), 90 Stat. 1266-67 (to be
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 3508(3)).
70. Id. § 9(3)(C)(ii), 90 Stat. 1267 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 3508(3)(C)(ii)).
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Regulations as ownership by a foreign person of five percent or
more of the entity."
A penalty of up to 25 percent of the fair market value of the land
may be assessed for failure to submit a report, for knowingly omitting required information, or for knowingly submitting false or
misleading information. 2 The penalty is an amount "appropriate
to carry out the purposes of the Act";73 no standard for determining
74
the amount of the penalty is stated in the regulations.
B.

Application to Corporations

The ability of investors to erect a "chain" of corporations raises
the possibility that the reporting requirements with regard to secResident aliens and entities in which they hold an interest are not required to
report. See S. REP. No. 1072, supra note 39, at 12.
71. 44 Fed. Reg. 29032 (1979) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 781.2(1)). The
determination that five percent ownership would constitute a "significant interest" reflects an attempt to gather as much data as possible without creating an
undue burden for United States corporations, which might have difficulty determining whether small shareholders are foreign persons. This is reflected in the
Regulations, which provide that, while five percent ownership by any number of
foreign persons will trigger the reporting requirement, only the identities of shareholders who individually own a five percent interest must be reported. See 44 Fed.
Reg. 29030 (1979).
For statistical purposes, it will be necessary for the Department of Agriculture
to segregate its data into direct and portfolio investment as defined by the International Investment Study Act of 1976. That Act defines "direct investment" as
a ten percent interest or greater in an entity, and "portfolio investment" as all
other investment, 22 U.S.C. § 3102(10), (11) (1976); the reports to Congress under
the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974 were divided in the same manner. See
BENCHMARK SURVEY, supra note 3, at 1, 4-6.
72. Act of Oct. 14, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-460, § 3(a), 90 Stat. 1265 (to be
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 3502(a)).
73. Id. § 3(b) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 3502(b)).
74. 44 Fed. Reg. 29033 (1979) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 781.4(b)). Remarks
in the House indicate that the penalty is to be determined by the degree of
willfullness of the failure to report as required. 124 CONG. REc. H10,760 (daily ed.
Sept. 26, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Foley); but see id. at H12,374 (daily ed. Oct. 11,
1978) (remarks of Rep. Grassley, noting that "knowingly" does not include "has
reason to know").
Determining when to graduate the penalty may be difficult if negligent or
reckless conduct does not result in a penalty under the Act. See id. The Department might in appropriate cases look to surrounding circumstances such as the
experience of the investor, the effectiveness or ability of counsel, or willingness
to cooperate upon being notified by the Department that a penalty might be
assessed.
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ond-and third-tier parents, while disclosing the fact that land is
foreign owned, may not disclose ultimate ownership by foreign
persons."5 For corporate chains composed entirely of United States
entities, this may be accomplished by a four-tier arrangement; for
chains where two or more of the entities are foreign corporations,
there may be no jurisdiction to compel disclosure of even second- and third-tier entities in certain instances. 6
1. United States Corporations
The Act does not require disclosure of a fourth tier of ownership;" thus, such an arrangement could theoretically hide the
identity of foreign owners. Multi-tier corporate structures are frequently employed by foreign persons investing in the United States
in order to take advantage of favorable tax treatment under United
States tax treaties;" these arrangements often involve four or more
levels of ownership. 9 By the time three entities have been set up,
however, a good deal of time and money will have been consumed." Further, the corporations may lack any business purpose
apart from evading the requirements of the Act. In such a case the
Department of Agriculture may be able to disregard intermediate
entities and compel disclosure by persons farther up the chain.
Although the rule is applied sparingly, a, corporate entity may
be disregarded where its sole purpose is to avoid the effect of a
statute.' It has been held that an administrative agency must be
75. Where interests in a corporation are held in bearer shares, it may be
impossible to know whether any interest is held by a foreign person. The Regulations take this into consideration by providing that the identities of interest
holders must be disclosed only if their individual interests are five percent or
greater. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29030 (1979). Further, the investigatory power given to
the Department of Agriculture by section 4 of the Act should be adequate to
discover most attempts to evade the reporting requirement.
76. See LEGAL ENVIRONUENT FOR FOREIGN DIREcT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 24 (R. Rosendahl ed. 1972) ("The real issue will be the extent to which a
foreign parent corporation may be subject to liability in the United States
77. Act of Oct. 14, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-460, § 2, 90 Stat. 1263-65 (to be
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 3501); see 44 Fed. Reg. 29030 (1979).
78. See generally Knight, Planningfor Foreign Investments in U.S. Real
Estate, 36 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1081 (1978).
79. See, e.g., I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 7731043 (May 6, 1977).
80. See DeVos, Foreign Entities Investing in the United States, 37 N.Y.U.
INST. FED. TAX. § 23.09, at 23-25 to 23-26 (1979).
81. See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943); 18
Am. JUR. 2D, CORPORATIONS, §§ 14, 15 at 559-62 (1965).
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delegated the power to do so;"2 the question has arisen for a federal
agency with regard to radio station licensing by the Federal Communications Commission. In General Telephone Co. v. United
States,"' the court held that the FCC had the power to disregard a
corporate entity in denying a licensing petition, stating:
To hold otherwise would balk the Commission in the exercise of
its statutory duties ....

Where the statutory purpose could thus

be easily frustrated through the use of separate corporate entities,
the Commission is entitled to look through corporate form and treat
the separate entities as one and the same for purposes of regulation.

4

While the Act does not state specifically that the Secretary of
Agriculture may disregard an entity and require disclosure by its
parents, there is broad language in the Act concerning the Secretary's powers to investigate reports. Section four states that:
The Secretary may take such actions as the Secretary considers
necessary to monitor compliance with the provisions of this Act and
to determine whether the information contained in any report submitted under section 2 accurately and fully reveals the ownership
interest of all foreign persons in any foreign person who is required
to submit a report under such section."
Whether the Department will test the limits of this section remains
to be seen. The Regulations suggest that the determination that a
foreign person has invested in agricultural property may be sufficient for statistical purposes, without an inquiry into ultimate
ownership, 8 and do not address the question of sham corpora7

tions.1

2.

Foreign Corporations

When a corporate chain involves foreign entities, two problems
82. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rich, 220 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1969); Roberts' Fish
Farm v. Spencer, 153 So.2d 718, 720 (Fla. 1963).
83. 449 F.2d 846, 855 (5th Cir. 1971).
84. Id. (citing Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 86 U.S. App. D.C. 102, 180 F.2d
28 (1950)). The court in Mansfield Journal noted that the Commissioner was
empowered to consider the conduct and history of the applicant. 180 F.2d at 3233; see 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1976).
85. Act of Oct. 14, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-460, § 4, 92 Stat. 1265 (to be codified
at 7 U.S.C. § 3503).
86. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29030 (1979).
87. See id. at 29031-33 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 781.1-781.3).
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may arise. First, ultimate ownership may be hidden in a fourth tier
of ownership, as in the case of a domestic corporate chain. Second,
the United States may not have jurisdiction to require a report by
the second-tier entity. When the first-tier entity is a domestic corporation, owned by a foreign (second-tier) entity, the creation of a
domestic corporation should be an act sufficient to subject the
foreign, second-tier entity to United States jurisdiction under the
rule of section 17(a) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW. Where the first-tier entity is created under the laws
of a foreign country, however, the second-tier entity cannot be said
to have acted in the United States within the meaning of the
RESTATEMENT rule. That section reads: "A state has jurisdiction to
prescribe a rule of law (a) attaching legal consequences to conduct
that occurs within its territory .....

,1 Similarly, while § 17(b) of

the RESTATEMENT provides that a state may prescribe the legal
consequences of conduct "relating to a thing located, or a status
or other interest localized, in its territory," 9 it would appear that
the parent's interest in its subsidiary is located in the state of the
subsidiary's incorporation.
Two theories might be employed to require a report by the
second-tier entity in such a situation. The corporation entity may
be disregarded as a sham; in many cases, however, the first-tier
entity is created by two or more co-venturers, for various independent business reasons. When this occurs, the limitations on the
sham corporation theory may preclude its use to require disclosure.
Further, the use of the theory against entities organized under the
laws of a foreign country might result in protests by that country's
government."
Alternatively, a report might be required utilizing the "effects"
test of section 18(b) of the RESTATEMENT, which provides that a
state may prescribe legal consequence to extraterritorial conduct
where:
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 17(a) (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
89. Id.
90. See part IV.A. infra. The Internal Revenue Service has declined to employ
the sham corporation theory against foreign investors even where it is clear that
an intermediate entity is being employed for the purpose of taking advantage of
a favorable tax treaty by non-residents of the treaty country. See Rev. Rul. 7523, 1975-1 C.B.290; IRS Private Letter Ruling 7809024 (Nov. 29, 1977). But cf.
Rev. Rul. 79-65, 1979-8 I.R.B. 48 (sham corporation theory applied where treaty
permits).
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(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity
to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with
the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have
reasonably developed legal systems."
This section, however, has usually been applied to conduct violative of United States antitrust or securities laws, where an economic injury occurs as a result of an act in a foreign country.2 It
is difficult to say whether creating a corporation under foreign law
has any effect in the United States, because it is the subsidiary
which decides to invest in the United States, not the parent. It may
be more analytically sound, therefore, to apply the sham corporation theory in this case.
IV.

CONFLICTS OF THE ACT WITH OTHER LAws

A. Foreign Law
Efforts by the United States to obtain information from foreign
entities have occasionally met with resistance from foreign governments. For example, Swiss law strictly limits disclosure to officials,
and attempts to obtain information have resulted in diplomatic
tensions between the two countires9 3 The Canadian province of
Ontario passed an act making removal of business records from the
91. RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 18(b).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443
(2d Cir. 1945) (court of appeals sitting as court of last resort); cf. Leaseco Data
Processing Equipment Co. v. Maxwell, 319 F. Supp. 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (judicial jurisdiction).
93. Article 273 of the Swiss secrecy laws provides that:
Whosoever seeks out a manufacturing or business secret in order to make
it available to a foreign authority or to a foreign organization or private
enterprise or to their agents,
Whosoever makes available a manufacturing or business secret to a foreign authority or to a foreign organization or to a private enterprise or to
their agents,
Shall be punished with imprisonment.
As quoted in Zagaris, The Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of
1978: The First Regulation of ForeignInvestment in United States Real Estate,
in FOREIGN TAX PLANNING 1979, at 67, 94 (P.L.I. 1979); see Kelly, United States
Foreign Policy: Efforts to Penetrate Bank Secrecy in Switzerland from 1940 to
1975, 6 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 211 (1976). See generally Farhat, Le secret bancaireen
droit libanais, 25 TRAVAUX DE L'AssOCIATION HENRI CAPrrANT 283 (1974); Henrion,
Le secret des affaires en droit belge, id. at 195, 200.
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province a crime as a result of United States subpoenas issued to
50 Canadian corporations in an antitrust investigation. 4
Amendments to the Act in the House committee removed language which would have forbidden the Secretary of Agriculture to
require disclosure where disclosure would be violative of foreign
law." Assuming that the foreign entity has subjected itself to
United States jurisdiction, it is permissible for the United States
to require conduct inconsistent with foreign law. 8 Section 40 of the
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW lists several factors to be
considered in enforcing the requirement of disclosure:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in
the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can
reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state."
Enforcement of disclosure would be permitted by the
RESTATEMENT rule. The ownership of land is one of the most vital

of national concerns; this principle is universally recognized, both
in the laws in foreign countries restricting investment in real property,"8 and in numerous friendship, commerce and navigation
(FCN) treaties which make special provision for ownership of real
property by foreign nationals. 9 The hardship imposed on foreign
entities would be an inability to invest in United States agricultural property; their investment could be made in another area,
however, while in the absence of enforcement the United States
must do without information about its own land. Finally, enforcement will undoubtedly achieve compliance, as a lien may be
placed on the land.
The burden of the conflicting obligations will fall upon the foreign investor who wishes to purchase real estate. The conflict may
be avoided by concealing the identity of foreign entities with a
94. See 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 167 (1968).
95. H.R. REP. No. 1570, supra note 1, at 22.
96. RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 39(1).
97. Id. § 40.
98. See Morse, Legal Structures Affecting InternationalReal Estate
Transactions, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 34, 45-64 (1976).
99. See part IV.B. infra.
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chain of three United States subsidiaries. ' As the Act does not
require disclosure of the identity of a fourth level of ownership,
there will be no disclosure of a business secret of the foreign parent.'01 If the Department of Agriculture should vigorously employ
a sham corporation theory to penetrate such structures, however,
entities in countries with secrecy laws may be precluded from investing in agricultural property in the United States.
B.

United States Treaty Obligations

United States treaties governing investment by foreign persons
are of two types: first, numerous bilateral treaties of friendship,
commerce and navigation;' 2 second, the Code of Liberalization of
Capital Movements drafted by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development." 3 The Act does not conflict with
existing obligations under FCN treaties. The treaties provide for
national and most-favored-nation treatment of foreign persons for
several types of investments, but no FCN treaty gives national
treatment to aliens with regard to acquisition or ownership of real
estate. 04 Some treaties provide for national treatment with regard
to leasing of real estate for certain purposes, but provide an exception for agricultural property.' 5 The Act will require a reservation
100.
101.
102.

See text accompanying note 77 supra.
See note 93 supra.
In 1979 these treaties affected some 76 states. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
TREATIES IN FORCE (1979). The treaties provide for the protection of property
rights of foreign persons, and preserve the right of the United States to protect
its interests in vital sectors of the economy. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce & Navigation, United States-Denmark, arts. VII. IX. Oct. 1, 1981,
[1961] 1 U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 4797, 421 U.N.T.S. 105 (entered into force July
30, 1961).
103.

See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CODE OF

LIBERALIZATION OF CAPTIAL MovEmENTS (1973) (with supplements) [hereinafter
cited as OECD CODE]. The OECD Convention has the status of an executive
agreement, as it has not been consented to by the Senate. See Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, opened for signature Dec. 14, 1960,
[1961] 2 U.S.T. 1728, 1751-52, T.I.A.S. No. 4891 (adherence of the United
States); Note, The Rising Tide of Reverse Flow: Would a Legislative Breakwater
Violate U.S. Treaty Commitments?, 72 MICH. L. REv. 551, 577-80 (1974).
104. See Morse, supra note 98, at 45. While Professor Morse indicates that
some FCN treaties provide for national treatment with regard to acquisition, id.
at 42, the treaties do not bear this out. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
& Navigation, Nov. 28, 1956, United States-Korea, [1957] 2 U.S.T. 2217,
T.I.A.S. No. 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3947, 302 U.N.T.S. 281.
105. See, e.g., Convention of Establishment, Nov. 25, 1959, United StatesFrance, art. VII, para. 2, [1960] 2 U.S.T. 2398, T.I.A.S. No. 4625, 401 U.N.T.S.
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to the United States commitment to the OECD Code. The Code
provides for abolition of restrictions on movement of capital,' but
permits reservations at any time with regard to purchase of real
estate.' 7 The Code further provides that the reasons for a reservation must be given. '
C. State DisclosureLaws
With the passage of the federal act, the possibility arises that
state statutes requiring disclosure of foreign ownership. of agricultural property may be preempted. Although restrictions on foreign
investment in real estate exist in about 25 states,0 9 few state statutes requiring disclosure of foreign ownership of real estate existed
until recently, with only Iowa, Nebraska and Minnesota having
such statutes." 0 The Iowa statute requires disclosure of agricultural holdings by corporations, partners and fiduciaries, and of the
identity of nonresident aliens who hold interests."' The Nebraska
statute requires disclosure by corporations of their holdings and of
the identity of nonresident aliens who hold interests.1 12 Bills have
been introduced in several states to enact disclosure statutes; a
proposed bill in Tennessee is similar to the federal act. 1 The
preemption question is of particular importance for a state such as
Iowa, whose disclosure statute has existed for some time, and has
been administered with a good deal of effort and interest by state
officials.'
75; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United StatesJapan, art. IX, para. 2, [1953] 2 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863, 206 U.N.T.S.
143.

106.

OECD CODE, supra note 103, art. 1(a).

107. Id. art. 2(b)(iv); id. Annex A, List B(V)(A)(1).
108. Id. art. 12(a); see Morrison, supra note 67, at M-39.
109. See Fisch, State Regulation of Alien Land Ownership, 43 Mo. L. REv.
407 (1978). See generally Note, State Regulation of Foreign Investment, 9
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 82 (1975).
110. 10 IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 172C.1 to 172C.15 (West Supp. 1978); 4 NEB. REV.
STAT. § 76-1501 to 76-1506 (1976); see S. REP. No. 1072, supra note 39, at 25
(noting Minnesota statute); Harl, The Iowa Reporting Law and Alien Ownership,
in 8 BENCHMARK SURVEY, supra note 3, at L-164; Morrison, supra note 67, at M11 to M-22; Note, Alien Ownership of South Dakota Farmland:A Menace to the
Family Farm?, 23 S.D. L. REV. 735, 739-41 (1978).
111. 10 IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 172C.5 to 172C.7 (West Supp. 1978).

112. 4

NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 76-1503 (1976).

113. See House Bill No. 273, Tennessee House of Representatives (introduced
Feb. 5, 1979).
114. See H.R. REP. No. 1570, supra note 1, at 20, 25; Harl, supra note 110.

Summer 1979]

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

A holding that the Act preempts a state disclosure statute might
be based upon one of two grounds; the first is that the state statute
intrudes upon a field of exclusive federal competence, whether or
not a federal statute is present."' In his concurring opinion in
Zschernig v. Miller,"' Justice Stewart stated that whether a state
may legislate in a given field depends upon "the basic allocation
of power between the States and the Nation." 7 Because the Oregon statute construed in Zschernig involved a state government in
"minute inquiries" into the practices of foreign governments,"' it
was relatively simple for the Court to characterize the field as
foreign relations. As the foreign relations power is assigned to the
federal government, the statute was held unconstitutional."' The
second ground for preemption is that the state statute conflicts
with a federal statute in violation of the supremacy clause of the
Constitution.120 In Hines v. Davidowitz, 2 the Court considered the
effect of a federal Alien Registration Act upon a Pennsylvania
statute requiring registration of aliens present in the state. The
Court stated: "[W]here the federal government . . . has enacted
a complete scheme of regulation . . . states cannot, inconsistently
with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or
complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary
regulations.' ' 12 Whether a state disclosure statute is preempted by
the Act therefore involves the questions of whether the states have
the power to legislate in the field of the Act, and whether the state
statute is consistent with the purpose of the Act. If the answer to
either question is no, the state statute would be preempted.
An application of the "basic allocation" test should not result
in preemption of a state disclosure statute, even though that statute might "provoke questions in the field of international affairs. 1 2 3 First, questions involving land ownership have histori115. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1948); Maier, The Bases and
Range of Federal Common Law in Private International Matters, 5 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 133 (1971). See generally Maier, CooperativeFederalism in International Trade: Its ConstitutionalParameters,27 MERCER L. REV. 391, 402-06
(1976).
116. 389 U.S. at 441.
117. Id. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 435.
119. Id. at 436.
120.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

121. 312 U.S. 52 (1940).
122. Id.at 66-67.
123. Id. at 66; see Maier, supra note 115, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. at 134.
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cally been a subject of state regulation, from the colonial period
until the present.' 4 This may be distinguished from Hines, where
power over alien registration was expressly allocated to the federal
government.'1 Second, disclosure statutes "do not involve a state
in scrutiny of particular foreign governments, but treat investors
from all nations alike. In Zschernig, on the other hand, the Court
was concerned with an "intrusion" into the foreign relations field,
even where it might be balanced by the state's interest in regulating succession of property.120 Because of the history of state regulation in the field, and the minimal effect upon foreign relations of
state disclosure statutes, a closer inquiry into the purpose and
effect of the federal and state statutes is required than was employed in Zschernig.
With regard to the test of Hines v. Davidowitz for preemption,
three issues must be addressed: the purposes of the federal statute,
the effect of the state statute upon achieving those purposes, and
12
whether Congress intended to permit regulation by the states.
The purposes of the Act here are two: first, to gather statistics on
foreign investment in agricultural property; 12 second, to remain
neutral with regard to foreign investment. While the former purpose is clear, the latter is less obvious. In considering the purposes
of the Act, it is appropriate to look at the other federal statutes
involving statistics on foreign investment in the United States, the
Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, and the International Investment Survey Act of 1976.129 The 1976 Act states that

"[n]othing in this chapter is intended to restrain or deter foreign
investment in the United States .

,,,"3 The 1978 Act does not

state that its purpose is to remain neutral with regard to foreign
124. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 605
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring); United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 320 (1877);
Anderson, A Survey of Alien Land Investment in the United States, Colonial
Times to Present,in 8 BENCHMARK SuRvEY, supra note 3, at L-2, L-4. See generally
Morrison, supra note 67.
125. 312 U.S. at 66.
126. 389 U.S. at 440.
127. Act of Oct. 14, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-460, title, 92 Stat. 1263; see H.R.
REP. No. 1570, supra note 1, at 11-12.
128. See 312 U.S. at 66-67, 73-74; cf. Maier, supra note 115, 5 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. at 151 (construing Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947)).
129. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-04 (1956) (construing a
series of statutes to determine congressional intent).
130. International Investment Survey Act of 1976, § 2(c), 22 U.S.C. § 3101(c)
(1976).
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investment, but this purpose appears in the legislative history.'3
Further, the fact that the Act is a part of the system set up under
the International Investment Survey Act'3 - is convincing evidence
that the intent of the 1976 act should affect the interpretation of
the 1978 act.
In contributing to information on foreign investment in agricultural property, state disclosure statutes are clearly consistent with
the purpose of Congress. Whether state statutes present an additional deterrent to foreign investment, however, depends upon
whether the deterrent factor is seen as the very existence of the
statute, or the penalty incurred. In Hines v. Davidowitz, the Court
viewed the existence of the statute as the deterrent, noting the
possibility of "repeated interception and interrogation."' 3 3 Once
information about a foreign investor has been made public, however, no deterrent effect is likely as a result of having to file a report
with another governmental agency.'34 Rather, the additional deterrent factor exists in the possibility that an additional financial
penalty may be assessed.
This analysis provides a basis for discriminating among state
statutes based upon the size of the penalty assessed, in order to
determine whether a state statute contravenes the purpose of Congress to remain neutral with regard to foreign investment. Both the
Iowa and Nebraska statutes provide for a penalty not to exceed
1,000 dollars.'35 Such a penalty would be relatively insignificant in
large land transactions; in view of the long-standing state interest
in regulating land ownership, such a penalty could be viewed as a
minor and permissible hindrance to effecting the purpose of the
Act. On the other hand, large penalties, such as the flat 25 percent
of market value imposed by the Tennessee bill,' 36 could have a
deterrent effect on investment by foreign persons. By doubling the
penalty, such a statute significantly alters the incentive to report
thought sufficient by Congress, and could be preempted under the

131. See H.R. REP. No. 1570, supra note 1, at 11-12; cf. 124 CONG. REC.
S19,113 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Percy).
132. See H.R. REP. No. 1570, supra note 1, at 9-10; S. REP. No. 1072, supra
note 35, at 4.
133. 312 U.S. at 66.
134. See G. WUNDERLICH, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT: FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN
U.S. REAL ESTATE 8 (Agric. Info. Bull. No. 400, 1976).
135. 10 IOWA CODE ANN. § 172C.11 (West Supp. 1978); 4 NEB. REV. STAT. §

76-1506 (1976).
136. House Bill No. 273, Tennessee House of Representatives (introduced
Feb. 5, 1979).
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Hines rationale.
With regard to Congress' intent to preempt state statutes, the
Court in Hines noted that a comprehensive federal statute is one
indication that preemption is intended.' 7 It has been noted, however, that comprehensiveness "may show only that a problem is so
complex that federal agencies must work along with state agencies
to solve it."'' Several factors suggest that Congress considered
foreign investment in agricultural property such a problem. First,
section six of the Act requires the Secretary of Agriculture to transmit reports by foreign persons to state agencies.' 9 Second, the
House Report notes the need for state participation in analyzing
data. "' Representative Grassley noted that "[c]lose cooperation
with the States in the administration of this new program will be
necessary . .

.

. Such cooperation and exchange of information

will aid the effectiveness of this new program and assist the States
in decisionmaking on issues relating to foreign investment within
their borders.""' For these reasons, state statutes found not to be
undue deterrents to foreign investment should not be preempted
by the Act.
V.

CONCLUSION

The primary benefit of the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978 will be the completion of the data base for
benchmark surveys under the International Investment Survey
Act of 1976.12 In controlling and directing foreign direct investment, Congress needs information on the effect of investment in
each sector of the economy, as investment in one sector may be
more beneficial for the United States economy than investment in
another.' If foreign direct investment in agricultural property is
found to be less beneficial to the United States than investment
in other sectors of the economy, then that investment should be
137. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 69, 74.
138.
(1978).
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363, 369
Act of Oct. 14, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-460, § 6, 92 Stat. 1266.
See H.R. REP. No. 1570, supra note 1, at 11.
Id. at 30.
See text accompanying notes 54-58, supra.
See H.R. REP. No. 1570, supra note 1, at 7; 124 CONG. REc. H8574 (daily
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channeled into those other sectors.
The effect of foreign direct investment in agricultural property
cannot be understood in isolation from other forces at work in that
sector of the economy. This was clear to the legislatures of Iowa
and Nebraska, whose disclosure systems monitor all large agricultural investments. The decline in the family farm has been evident
for too long to be blamed in any significant measure on foreign
direct investment; the effect of absentee landlords is the same
regardless of their nationality. These facts were brought out by the
Department of Agriculture several times during consideration of
the Act.'44 That they were ignored suggests that the Act's goal of
saving the family farm may have been compromised, either by a
narrow view of current agricultural problems, which is unlikely,'
or by political forces that would have prevented the passage of a
statute requiring disclosure by domestic as well as foreign entities.
The limitations upon farm ownership by large agribusiness concerns in the Family Farm Antitrust Act are one step toward remedying this deficiency in the Act, to the extent that those limitations are justified by findings on the effect of large farms in the
agricultural sector. The more stringent limitations placed upon
foreign agricultural investment by that act and the Agricultural
Foreign Investment Control Act,"4 however, are indefensible in the
absence of proof that such investment has a detrimental effect on
the agricultural economy.
Although logically the Act should not have a detrimental effect
upon the United States position as an advocate of free trade, it
conveys an unmistakable signal that the longstanding "open door"
policy to foreign investment is being critically reexamined. The
United States has had restrictions on alien ownership in "key sectors" for some time, 47 and the general practice among nations
suggests that real estate is regarded as a sector where special restrictions may be appropriate. 4 Many foreign investors already
will be familiar with disclosure statutes in the United States; the
Securities Exchange Act requires registration by beneficial owners
144. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
145. See part II.B. supra.
146. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
147. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 24, 72, 181, 352 (1976) (mineral rights on
federal lands); 46 U.S.C. §§ 289, 808, 865, 883 (1976) (coastal and internal fisheries).
148. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Policies, Laws and Regulations of Other
Major Industrialized Nations Concerning Inward Investment, in 9 BENCHMARK
SURVEY, supra note 1, at N-i; text accompanying notes 97-98 supra.
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of ten percent of a corporation, and by certain persons acquiring
stock in a takeover bid.'49 These requirements, however, apply to
domestic as well as foreign investors. The Act is not a dramatic
reversal in policy, as it seeks only information; although the Family Farm Antitrust Act is a reversal in policy, it is not yet law and
such bills have failed to pass several recent sessions of Congress. 50
If the United States is to continue to declare itself a proponent of
free trade in order to ensure the freedom of its own citizens to
invest abroad 5' it may not be sufficient to argue to other nations
that they also have key sector restrictions. This is to admit that
such restrictions are in some cases in the best interests of the host
country, a position that the United States has historically rejected. 5 ' Such an argument also leaves the United States open to
the charge that it advocates free trade only so long as it is in its
own interest to do so. In view of the current economic problems of
the agricultural sector, the protection of a land data system might
have been worth the risk that such a charge will be made. There
was, however, no explicit consideration of this trade off in the
legislative history. Further, it is likely that the Act will produce
information on land ownership which will require supplementation
by data on domestic landowners, making additional legislation
necessary before meaningful results can be obtained.
Edward C. Brewer, III
149. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(d), 16(a), 15 U.S.C. §§
78m(d), 78p(a) (1976).
150. See, e.g., H.R. 13, 183, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (to prohibit purchase
of agricultural land by foreign persons); Note, U.S. Regulation of ForeignDirect
Investment: Current Developments and the CongressionalResponse, 15 VA. J.
INT'L

L. 611 (1975).
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Cong., 2d Sess.), I (82d Cong., 2d Sess.), J (82d Cong., 2d Sess.), C (83d Cong.,
1st Sess.): Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark, Greece, Finland, Germany, and Japan, Respectively, 83d
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